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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WESLEY CLOCK AND 
ANNE CLOCK, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
JOHN F. GREEN AND 
LARUE GREEN, 
Defendants/Appellants, ) 
) APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
I Case No. 960797-CA 
> Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from a final judgment entered pursuant to 
appellees' motion for summary judgment. The final judgment 
denied appellants' counter-motion for summary judgment. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, this case was poured-over to the Court of 
Appeals for disposition. This Court has jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §§ 78-
2-2(3)(j) and 78-2-2(4) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Does the subject lease agreement sufficiently describe 
the option to purchase without the need for extrinsic 
evidence? 
The appellees adopt the standard of review set forth in 
appellants' brief. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
...The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law... 
U.C.A., §25-5-3: 
Every contract for the leasing for a 
longer period than one year, or for the 
sale, of any lands, or any interest in 
lands, shall be void unless the contract, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party by whom 
the lease or sale is to be made, or by 
his lawful agent thereunto authorized in 
writing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal by John F. Green and Larue G 
reen ("Greens") from a final judgment entered pursuant to a 
motion for summary judgment by Wesley Clock and Anne Clock 
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("Clocks"). The Greens made a counter-motion for summary 
judgment. The lower court, after hearing the arguments of 
counsel, entered an order and judgment granting the Clocks' 
motion for summary judgment and denying the Greens' counter-
motion for summary judgment. A copy of the order and judgment 
is attached to appellants' brief as Appendix "B". The order 
and judgment determined that the Greens must convey property 
at 1324 East 5485 South, Salt Lake City, Utah to the Clocks 
upon receipt of the balance of the purchase price of 
$76,500.00. It was also ordered that any payments made by the 
Clocks to the Greens for rent after August 4, 1996 be applied 
against the balance of the purchase price. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Clocks and Greens entered into a rental 
arrangement for property at 1324 East 5485 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The parties understood and agreed that the 
property to be rented was at the said address. R. 1, 2, 12, 
13, 19, & 33. 
2. In connection with the rental arrangement, the 
Clocks insisted that the Greens provide them with an option 
to purchase the property. R. 19. 
3. The Greens prepared a hand written agreement for 
rent and for an option to purchase: 
3 
I Wesley Clock and Anne Clock agree to 
pay $675.00 per month plus sewer and 
water. There is a $350 deposit plus a 
$1,000 for lease option to buy. Starting 
July 29, 1991 pro-rated to Aug. 4, 1991. 
The selling price to be $81,500 at 10 H 
% interest. When option is picked up, the 
$350 plus the $1,000 will be applied to 
the down payment of $5,000 or more. The 
Seller will re-roof and make the carport 
into a double garage. Replace the back 
door. Other than the things above, the 
Clocks will take care of any repairs 
during this option period. There will be 
a balloon payment due on the balance of 
the loan Aug. 5, 1996. The rent to be 
prorated from July 29, 1991 to Aug. 4', 
1991. Rent to begin on Aug. 5, 1991. 
August 2 is $500; August 5 is $700; 
balance by Aug. 20, 1991. If the Clocks 
do not buy they will be renters and money 
will not be refunded. (Attached hereto as 
Appendix "A") R. 5, 20, & 33. 
4. The Clocks paid the $350.00 deposit and the 
$1,000.00 lease option amount to the Greens at the time of 
the execution of the agreement. The Greens accepted said 
payments. R. 2 & 20. 
5. The Greens did not give a notice of the termination 
of the option to purchase until after the Clocks gave a 
notice of an intent to exercise the option on April 12, 1996. 
(A copy of the notice of intent to exercise the option is 
attached hereto as Appendix "B") R. 7, 13, 20. 
6. The Greens have refused to sell the property at 
1324 East 5485 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, to the Clocks for 
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the option price of $81,500.00. R. 13, 20, & 21. 
7. The Clocks, in connection with this action, 
tendered $3,650.00 to the court as the balance of the 
$5,000.00 down payment called for in the option. R. 21 & 28. 
8. The appellees dispute the appellants' statement of 
facts in the following respects: 
a. While the contract does not specify the 
address of the property, there has never been a dispute 
as to the location of the property. R. 1, 2, 12, 13, 19, 
Sc 3 3 . 
b. The agreement, by its reasonable 
interpretation, provides an option period to August 5, 
1996. R. 5, 20 & 23. 
c. While there is a factual dispute on parole 
statements at the time of the execution of the 
agreement, the agreement is silent as to the subject of 
said parole allegations. R. 5, 20 & 23. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The agreement is sufficiently clear on the terms of 
the option to purchase. Therefore, the parole evidence rule 
would exclude evidence of additional terms to those in the 
agreement, including contemporaneous conversations, 
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statements, or representations offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of the contract. 
2. When a lease includes an option to purchase, the 
term of the option is appropriately interpreted to be the 
termination date of the lease unless another option period is 
specified within the lease itself. In keeping with the 
purpose of the Statute of Frauds under U.C.A. §25-5-3, a 
court should not impose a condition on an option which is not 
contained within the writing so long as the option can be 
interpreted without parole evidence. 
3. Any ambiguity in the written agreement should be 
resolved in favor of the Clocks, since the Greens drafted the 
agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE AGREEMENT IS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO 
ESTABLISH THE TERMS OF THE OPTION. 
It is incumbent upon an optionor and an optionee to act 
fairly and in good faith to fulfill their obligation to each 
other in connection with an option agreement. Nielson v. 
Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1983). The Greens are not acting 
fairly in this case. Our option states that "The selling 
price to be $81,500.00 at 10^ % interest... There will be a 
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balloon payment due on the balance of the loan August 5, 
1996." The Greens refuse to allow the Clocks to purchase the 
property for $81,500.00 even though the agreement contains no 
deadline for the exercise of the option. By the language of 
the agreement, the option price could have been paid at any 
time prior to August 5, 1996. The Greens, even if they 
intended a shorter option period, never gave any notice of a 
termination of the option. Also no option exercise deadline 
is included within the written agreement. R. 7, 13 & 20. 
The appellants, have raised the argument for the first 
time in this appeal that the agreement does not contain the 
address of the property. However, this has never been an 
issue before. The complaint alleged the property address and 
the defendants' answer admitted the same. R. 1, 2, 12, & 13. 
The Clocks rented this property and have been living there 
ever since the date of the agreement. Therefore, this 
omission from the agreement should not operate to avoid the 
parole evidence rule regarding the option. "The parole 
evidence rule as a principal of contract interpretation has 
a very narrow application. Simply stated, the rule operates 
in the absence of fraud to exclude contemporaneous 
conversations, statements, or representations offered for the 
purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated 
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contract." Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985). 
This Court stated the following in Webb v. R.O.A. 
General, Inc., 804 P.2d 547 (Utah Appellant 1991): 
If an agreement is integrated, the parole 
evidence rule excludes evidence of terms 
in addition to those in the agreement, 
thus excluding "^conte mp oraneous 
c o n v e r s a t i o n s , statements, or 
representation offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated contract'" Colonial Leasing 
Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const.
 r 731 P.2d 
483, 486 (Utah 1986) [quoting Union Bank 
v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 
1985)] . A nonintegrated contract may 
exist where the terms are not ambiguous, 
but the nature of the agreement itself is 
unclear. Id. "Only when contract terms 
are complete, clear and unambiguous can 
they be interpreted by the judge on a 
motion for summary judgment." Id. at 
488. 
In our case, the terms regarding the option are both clear 
and non-ambiguous. The purchase price is set. The date when 
the purchase price must be finally paid is also set. Our 
agreement is silent as to the down payment date and the 
period of the option. The law does not require that those 
terms be included in an option in order for an agreement to 
be integrated. In other words, a down payment date and an 
option period are not necessary terms for the existence of an 
option. The Webb case confirms this principal by stating 
that "Courts are not obligated to rewrite contracts entered 
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into by parties dealing at arm's length, to relieve one party 
from a bargain later regretted, simply on supposed equitable 
principles. Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 
P. 2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982)." Id^ _ at 551." The Greens now 
regret the deal because they could apparently sell the 
property for more than they had promised to sell it to the 
Clocks for. This does not justify looking beyond the 
integrated contract terms for excuses to rewrite the 
agreement. \ 
It is acknowledged that the contract bears little 
resemblance to one drafted by an attorney. It is not artfully 
or well written. However, this does not mean that extrinsic 
evidence should be sought to add to the agreement. The 
agreement is sufficiently clear to stand on its own with 
respect to the option. 
II. 
AS A LEASE OPTION ON REAL PROPERTY, 
THE AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE 
IT CONTAINS A PURCHASE PRICE AND A DATE 
WHEN THE FULL PURCHASE MUST BE PAID. 
The agreement in questions specifies a purchase price of 
$81,500.00. It also contains the date when the purchase price 
must be fully paid - August 5, 1996. The Utah Supreme Court 
has upheld options which contain just such information. In 
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the case of Hoffman v. Sullivan. 599 P.2d 505, (Utah 1979), 
the Court stated: 
The trial court's finding that there was 
ambiguity in the option provision because 
there was "no provision... made as to how 
and when payments would be made" is 
unsupportable. The option price was 
fixed and as to that there was no 
dispute. In general, such a provision 
calls for a payment of cash at the time 
of the exercise of the option, hence, as 
a matter of law, there was no ambiguity 
as to how and when payments would be 
made. 
Just recently this court sustained 
a contract which was more ambiguous than 
the pertinent provision in the instant 
contract (Citation omitted) [t]his court 
affirmed this enforceability of a 
contract in which the only term fixed was 
the purchase price. 
Our agreement fixes the option price, the date when the 
full purchase price must be completed, the amount of the 
option price and the deposit to be applied to the down 
payment. There need be no deadline date for the making of the 
down payment nor a termination date on the option earlier 
than August 5, 1996. The Washington Appellate Court dealt 
with a question similar to that of this case. In the case of 
Beaudry v. Harman. 626 P.2d 50 (28 Wash. App. 719) (Wash. 
App. 1981), an option included within the lease did not have 
a termination date. The Court ruled that absent a 
termination date for an option within a lease agreement, the 
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option will expire upon the termination of the lease. In our 
case, the agreement has no termination date on the option 
and no down payment date for the exercise of the option. 
Therefore, the option should be considered to expire on 
August 5, 1996. A notice of intent to exercise the option 
was given on April 12, 1996. The exercise of the option was 
adequate and timely. The refusal by the Greens to sell the 
property either by contract or by cash payoff prior to 
August 5, 1996 was in breach of the agreement they drafted. 
The Statute of Frauds at U.C.A. §25-5-3 requires matters 
involving real property to be set forth in writing. In 
keeping with the purpose of this statute, matters involving 
an option to purchase real property should be governed by the 
written document wherever possible, without resorting to 
extrinsic evidence. The trial judge appropriately reviewed 
the agreement and the record in accordance with Rule 56(c), 
U.R.C.P. It was determined that the option was sufficiently 
clear to order the sale. The alleged factual dispute 
regarding an earlier oral termination of the option did not 
need to be addressed because the written agreement already 
addressed the necessary terms of an option to purchase real 
property. 
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III. 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONTRACT SHOULD 
BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE CLOCKS. 
In 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts §347, 348, it states: 
It is also said that an instrument 
uncertain as to its terms is to be most 
strongly construed against the party 
thereto who causes such uncertainty to 
exist, especially if he is the party who 
drew the contract or selected its 
language... It is fundamental that 
doubtful language in a contract should be 
interpreted most strongly against the 
party who has selected that language, 
especially where he seeks to use such 
language to defeat the contract or its 
operation, unless the use of such 
language in the contract is prescribed by 
law...As corollary to the above rule, a 
contract drawn by one party must be 
construed, if its meaning is doubtful, in 
favor of the non-drafting party. 
The Greens are now attempting to use extrinsic evidence to 
defeat the operation of the option they wrote. Clocks allege 
that the agreement is clear on its face. Yet, even if it is 
considered uncertain in any respect, it should be construed 
against the Greens. By using reasonable construction of the 
contract, this Court need not go outside the express terms of 
the agreement to determine that the option could be exercised 
at any time before August 5, 1996. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Greens drafted a rental agreement which includes all 
the necessary terms for an option to purchase. The option 
price is established by the option. The date for the final 
payment of the purchase price is provided in the option. 
Also, the amount of the down payment is set forth in the 
agreement. The Clocks gave a notice of intent to exercise 
the option and paid the down payment prior to August 5, 1996. 
Yet, the Greens have refused to sell under the terms of the 
agreement they drafted. This is simply a breach of contract. 
The decision of the lower court should be affirmed and the 
Greens should be required to sell the property as agreed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^day of April, 1997. 
BRYAlfw. CANNON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby declare that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, three (3) copies of Appellee's Brief to the 
following on the. of April, 1997: 
David L. Grindstaff 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
457 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Wesley & Anne Clock 
1324 E 5985 S 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
April 10, 1996 
John F. Green 
9769 S. Tayside Drive 
South Jordan, Utah 84095-9730 
Re: Notification to Purchase 
1324 E 5985 S 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
This letter is inform you that in accordance with the copy of the attached agreement, we 
have applied for a morgage loan to purchase the property referenced. 
Sincerely, 
Wesley & Anne Clock 
APPENDIX "B" 
